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Abstract:
The article presents the determinants o f creating candidate lists in 
European Parliament elections in Poland. Its subject context is the evaluation 
of importance of selected factors with reference to the effect obtained in the 
election. The main study hypothesis assumes different patterns of creating can­
didate lists in EP elections in comparison to parliamentary elections, involving 
the combined occurrence of several determinants. The first o f them is the ten­
dency to fill the highest positions in candidate lists with popular people well- 
-known in the media, who have an advantage over anonymous ones. The se­
cond factor is territorial bonds connecting candidates with the electoral district 
where they stand for election. Another determinant taken into consideration is 
the territorial form of the candidate list. The last important element o f analysis 
is the concentration o f support, determined by the position on the candidate list.
Keywords:
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Introduction
One of the most important procedures defining elections in democratic 
states is the way of appointing candidates standing for election, often having 
a greater impact on the ultimate result of the elections than the applied electo­
ral system. As William Cross [2008: 615] writes concerning the selection pro­
cess, “party candidate selection processes may be equally or more determina- 
tive o f  who ends up in the legislature than are general elections”. Regardless 
of the applied electoral system, the institutionalization of the electoral process 
in contemporary democracies means that receiving a political nomination is
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the preliminary stage in the process of selection of political elites. The selec­
tion carried out by parties may have two main dimensions: the substantive one 
and the political one. The substantive demand assumes that the candidate sho­
uld have the relevant qualities, which on the one hand can facilitate generating 
support and as a consequence, selection, and on the other hand, predestine them 
to correctly fulfil their role resulting from the potential election. The political 
dimension of candidate selection may assume the necessity o f party member­
ship or at least ideological identity with the key values which constitute the 
axiological and policy foundation. Apart from these, nomination can be ob­
tained among others by way of coalition bargaining between political parties 
or family-and-friends connotations. The practical dimension of candidate lists 
selection is the process o f appointing candidates to run for election. It adopts 
four basic types: non-regulated appointment, appointment by local authorities, 
appointment by central authorities, and primary election (appointment by party 
members) [Sokol 2003: 73-75],
The execution o f the selection function involves the choice and strategic 
appointment o f candidates to stand for election. The candidates are then veri­
fied in the voting procedure. Krister Lundell [2004: 27-30] mentions centrali­
zed and decentralized ways of candidate selection and points out the size of the 
party as the main determinant. Large parties prefer the application of decentra­
lized model, and small ones adopt more democratic ways. In the way of selec­
tion, regional patterns are also important, as part o f which he indicates prefe­
rences for the centralized model among south European political parties and the 
opposite among Scandinavian ones, where the selection is rather decentralized. 
An important consequence of the application of a certain way of selection is 
the possible differences in the candidates’ political subjectivity level. The cen­
tralization of selection may contribute to reducing the candidates’ subjectivity, 
and decentralization may increase it instead [Shomer 2009: 953],
The article presents the specificity o f creating candidate lists in European 
Parliament elections in Poland. Its subject context is the evaluation of impor­
tance of selected factors with reference to the effect obtained in the election. 
The temporal context is the 2014 election. The subjective aspect includes the 
analysis o f the structure of candidate lists in two largest parties -  Platforma 
Obywatelska (Civic Platform) and Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Law and Justice). 
The main study hypothesis assumes different patterns of creating candidate li­
sts in EP elections in comparison to parliamentary elections, involving the com­
bined occurrence of several determinants. The first o f them is the tendency to 
fill the highest positions in candidate lists with popular people well-known in 
the media, who have an advantage over anonymous ones. The second factor is 
territorial bonds connecting candidates with the electoral district where they
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stand for election. Another determinant taken into consideration is the territo­
rial form of the candidate list. The last important element o f analysis is concen­
tration of support.
Candidate selection procedure in European Parliament elections
Although there have only been three European Parliament elections in 
Poland so far, they have already managed to leave their imprint on political par­
ties and the party system. Their institutional dimension and the character o f par­
ty competition mostly make them similar to parliamentary elections, but with a 
lower rank. Karlheinz Reif and Hermann Schmitt [1980: 6-11] called EP elec­
tions second-order elections, mainly because they are carried out on the basis of 
internal political determinants which marginalize the meaning of divisions and 
conflicts of the European environment. In addition, although EP elections are or­
ganized in all EU states at the same time, their importance is largely reduced by 
the fact that they occur at different stages of internal (national) electoral cycles. 
The presented conclusions were confirmed in the research by Michael Marsh 
[1998: 595]; however, in some cases he formulated them in less absolute terms. 
Additionally, the researcher confirmed the connection between EP elections and 
national elections taking place subsequently, referring in practice to their tempo­
ral correlation and national parliamentary elections [Gabel 2000: 54],
Taking into consideration the case of Poland, it is a little difficult to clas­
sify European Parliament elections, mainly due to the fact o f electing represen­
tatives for a supranational authority. This fact, despite its undeniably prestigious 
character, determines different strategies executed by political parties. Polish and 
European experiences in this regard show that parties treat these elections diffe­
rently, regarding them as second order elections, which is also partly contributed 
to by the low public interest (concerning participation) [de Vreese, Banducci, 
Semetko, Boomgaarden 2006], Radoslaw Markowski [2009: 31-32] observes 
that: the difference between parliamentary elections and EP elections is that
in these elections the national issues are more important than the European ones, 
also, that people vote in a way which shows it is according to their sincere and 
first preference, so small parties get the advantage ... ” . The place and character 
of exercising the mandate of MEP, which for obvious reasons makes it harder to 
engage fully in domestic politics and thus positions one far behind the national 
party leaders in the political hierarchy, is also important.
The presented determinants result in the fact that the process o f creating 
European Parliament candidate lists in the key parties is strongly centralized, 
and the appointments, unlike in any other elections, mainly depend on the party 
authorities. It is so for strategic reasons as part of which the decentralization of
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selecting candidates for the lists might cause the decrease of electoral potential 
of the whole party [Katz 2001: 290-291 ]. Dieter Nohlen [2004: 92] underscores 
that the form of a candidate list indicates both the voter-candidate relation and 
the candidate’s attitude to their own party, which is reflected in parties’ intere­
sts that might be harmed by individual ambitions of particular members. It does 
not mean, however, that the strategies of creating candidate lists o f particular 
parties are identical, nor that they are not subject to any modifications during 
the election preparation phase. The dynamics of political situation even requires 
the creation of alternative scenarios that might potentially be used in the case of 
changing conditions of the conducted campaign. Simon Hix [2004: 199] also 
observes that the degree of centralization of candidate selection in EP elections 
affects their later relations with the parent parties. Strong centralization leads to 
the deputy’s greater dependence on their party in the future. Finally, the attempt 
to centralize the way of creating candidate lists gives various effects, including 
a very limited ultimate result. It is so especially in the case of the states where 
the democratic procedures o f candidate selection are deeply rooted (e.g. Ireland) 
or where these procedures are even legally regulated [Katz 2001: 291].
The process o f candidate selection for the lists is also determined by the 
existing electoral system, both its general character and individual components 
[Hazan, Rahat 2006: 109], The proportional electoral formula, especially com­
bined with the relatively low number o f seats to apportion, forces the parties to 
fill the candidate lists, which may be a considerable challenge taking into con­
sideration the preferences for the national parliament among the key activists. 
And the problem is not the quantitative aspect, which is easy to manage for 
large parties, but the political position of the nominated candidates. The most 
significant party leaders execute their objectives at the national politics level, 
and treat the opportunity to participate in the EP as a risk of degradation or a 
loss o f political influence. That is why, somewhat analogously to elections to 
second chambers o f the parliament, it can be noted that the lists of the main par­
ties include persons not engaged in the processes of current party management.
The high importance of candidate selection mechanisms in EP elections 
is also the result o f combination of relatively big electoral districts (in terms 
of territory) and relatively low number of seats to be assigned in each district. 
It contributes to preparing candidate lists in a way which allows for party au­
thorities considerably controlling the direction of seat allocation. The descri­
bed mechanism results from two key factors. The first of them is geographic 
segmentation of support and the possibility to predict quite precisely the future 
number of achieved seats in particular districts. The second is empirically ve­
rifiable preference to support number one candidates from party lists, although 
obviously the fact o f typically placing party leaders there also plays a role.
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All this means that EP elections do not occur in a political vacuum but are sub­
ject to processes of transferring the patterns of internal party relations from the 
national level to the European platform [Meserve, Pemstein, Bernhard 2009: 2],
An important determinant o f creating EP candidate lists is nominating 
persons weakly associated with politics or even having no political connota­
tions. This mechanism is also present in parliamentary elections but its ran­
ge is relatively smaller. Such actions, although often effective (in the case of 
very popular candidates), from the point o f view of political party’s interest 
may evoke some doubts about treating voters subjectively and cause conflicts 
with local structures o f parties which may want to promote their representati­
ves on the lists. So-called celebrities present on candidate lists are supposed to 
increase the interest in party’s electoral offer, to warm up the technocratic ima­
ge and to reduce the political distance to the voters. The previous experiences 
show, however, that only few candidates from beyond the party mainstream can 
expect election success and EP seats, although greater preference in this regard 
is noticeable in Central and Eastern Europe [Andretta, Chelotti 2012: 12].
The third important aspect of creating candidate lists in EP elections is 
the possibility to use the potential o f first positions on the lists. It is connected 
with the voters’ tendency to vote for persons from the top of the list, although 
-  obviously -  the fact o f typically placing party leaders there also plays a role. 
In the 2009 election, among number one candidates from the 4 parties which 
participated in seat distribution, the leaders lost to party rivals with farther po­
sitions only in 8 cases (15.4%). This may prove the supposed relation between 
the position on the candidate list and the achieved support, although it does not 
fully explain the character o f the phenomenon [Wojtasik 2010: 394],
Candidate lists in the 2014 EP election
The key element of creating the lists in European Parliament election 
was the attempt to find balance between three factors. The first o f them is the 
general tendency to place persons the most popular in the media on the first po­
sitions of candidate lists, as they attract voters by their public visibility. The se­
cond element o f this balance is taking territorial bonds into consideration. Polish 
electoral districts in European Parliament elections are big and most o f them 
are territorially diversified. Other studies on the behaviours o f Polish voters, 
in turn, show that the territorial bond is an important factor influencing their 
decisions and hence the tendency to take this diversity into consideration when 
constructing candidate lists [Flis 2011], But in this case the additional element 
was the wish to influence the personal composition of party representation in 
the European Parliament election. This wish is not so obvious, as is proved by
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the fact that the Warsaw district had an excess o f candidates with a strong po­
sition in the media or inside the party who were interested in acquiring seats 
in relation to the number o f available seats. Hence the clear tendency to put up 
candidates from Warsaw in other districts.
In both main parties the phenomenon of putting up candidates in districts 
other than the places of residence had a similar extent. From PO (Civic Platform), 
8 candidates stood in other districts, 6 out of whom were registered in Warsaw 
or the agglomeration. From PiS (Law and Justice), 9 candidates stood in other 
districts, 8 out of whom were registered in Warsaw or the agglomeration. In PiS, 
2 o f them had the first position on the lists, and 3 of them, the second position. 
In PO, there were five number-one candidates in that group, and one candidate 
from the second position. In PO, four of the positions were seat-ensurmg posi­
tions, which means that they would give the candidates seats if the apportion­
ment only depended on the order on the list. All of them were the first positions 
of the lists. In PiS, four places taken by “parachute candidates” were also seat- 
-ensuring positions defined this way: two first positions and two second ones.
In the group of so-called “parachute candidates”, two persons in each 
party were candidates who had been bom and raised in the districts from which 
they stood but later moved to bigger centres. A1 these four persons had previo­
usly acquired seats standing in those districts in European or national elections. 
The same was typical o f the other four candidates -  two from each of the di­
scussed parties. Among the first position candidates, three persons from PO and 
two persons from PiS had no previous connections with the electoral districts. 
A clear tendency is noticeable here: if candidates from outside the districts ap­
peared on the lists, they were more often placed on top positions, although it 
was not a 100% rule.
Eight out o f the 17 candidates standing for election in places other than 
the places of residence -  nearly a half -  received the EP seats. This means 
a higher percentage of success than in the whole candidate group (in each of the 
main parties, fewer than 15% of candidates obtained seats). Two of such candi­
dates placed on seat-ensuring positions were beaten by candidates from farther 
positions -  the losers were Jacek Rostowski (according to the National Electoral 
Commission database, Jan Vincent-Rostowski) from position no. 1 on the PO 
list in Bydgoszcz, and Hanna Foltyn-Kubicka from position no. 2 on the PiS list 
in Warsaw. Three candidates acquired seats despite having completely no pre­
vious relations with the districts where they stood for election. All of them were 
candidates from the top list positions -  Dariusz Rosati from PO as well as Karol 
Karski and Ryszard Czamecki from PiS. The other candidates who received 
seats, especially the three candidates from positions other than first (Kazimierz 
Ujazdowski and Beata Gosiewska from PiS and Tadeusz Zwiefka from PO) are
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persons who had previously obtained seats in the districts where they were put 
up. These were the seats of: an MP, a senator and an MEP, respectively. Putting 
up a candidate from another district on the first position in Lublin by PO did not 
pay off, because the party lost the seat it had obtained there before.
The attempts to ensure seats for the chosen candidates by putting them 
up in other districts were generally limited to a small scale and had even more 
limited effects. Even placing a candidate at no. 1 position on the list did not gu­
arantee the seat if the candidate had not had anything in common with the par­
ticular district. Still, 3 out of 5 main party candidates received the seats. As for 
registration outside the district, it does not seem to be a particularly great bur­
den if the candidate has clear relations with the district -  either historical or re­
sulting from previously obtaining a seat in that district, even if the success had 
been the result o f having the first position on a sejm election list (Kazimierz 
Ujazdowski, Julia Pitera).
Territorial construction o f  the lists
The next stage of the analysis was to verify the degree of relevance of 
the final form of candidate lists of the two main parties to the territorial di­
visions in particular districts. Only the cases of Platforma Obywatelska and 
Prawo i Sprawiedliwość were chosen for analysis, because in the other parties, 
only one seat was received by a candidate from a position other than first. In ad­
dition, PiS obtained seats in all the districts, and PO in twelve out o f the thirteen 
districts. In a considerable number of districts, these parties obtained two se­
ats each. So in the case of these parties, the territorial diversity was significant. 
Not only first position candidates and not only candidates who managed to beat 
them had a chance to receive the seats but also persons from farther positions.
So the electoral district applied in senate elections was adopted as a ter­
ritorial diversity unit. This choice was motivated by the fact that the number of 
senate districts after the reform is similar to the number of candidates put up 
by the parties in the European Parliament elections. Neither the division into 
voivodeships, nor sejm election districts, nor even the division into poviats 
had this feature. A hundred and thirty candidates theoretically could be even­
ly distributed in a hundred senate districts. It should be remembered, however, 
that European Parliament electoral districts have different sizes and -  as a result 
-  cover different numbers o f senate districts. Hence, ideal allocation of candi­
dates in this division was impossible.
For the purpose of the analysis, some of the senate districts were com­
bined so that the number of units in none of the EP electoral district exceeded 
ten. In addition, the metropolises which are split into several districts in senate
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elections were treated as entire units. It was assumed that divisions of metropoli­
ses into senate districts are not based on deeper territorial differences.
Apart from metropolises, there was only a problem with the fit in Śląskie 
Voivodeshipi: thirteen senators are elected there, whereas only ten European 
Parliament candidates can be put up. For the purpose of the analysis, two ad­
jacent districts were combined in three cases. Two Częstochowa districts were 
combined, as were Rybnik and Jastrzębie Zdrój districts as well as Katowice 
district and the one including Tychy and Mysłowice towns and the Bieruń and 
Lędziny poviat.
This way, 91 units were isolated for analysis: from 3 in Warsaw I district 
up to 10 in Kraków, Katowice and Wroclaw districts. For each unit it was com­
puted what percentage of votes cast for a given party in the 2009 election in 
each district came from this particular unit. This allowed to estimate the signi­
ficance each part of the district should have for the candidate list created accor­
ding to such a conjecture.
In order to determine the importance of the territorial factor for the can­
didate lists, the significance of particular positions on the EP candidate lists 
was also estimated. The result o f the 2009 election was adopted as the point 
of reference, calculating for both parties what percentage of votes obtained in 
the whole country was obtained by the candidates from particular positions on 
the lists. The objective was to determine a general pattern with the greatest po­
ssible averaging of effects resulting from the candidates’ individual qualities. 
Importantly, the patterns resulting from this calculation were very similar to 
those concerning other (smaller) parties. There were some deviations, especial­
ly in the case of small or very specific parties, such as PSL (Polish Peasants ’ 
Party), but in the majority o f parties the same division occurred. Number one 
candidates received approximately half the votes, and then the vote participa­
tion of candidates from the next positions successively decreased, although at 
the end it grew again. The results averaged for both parties are presented in 
Chart 1.
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irt 1. Participation of candidates from particular positions in votes cast for the list 
on the 2009 election and the estimated significance of the position on the list
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Individual candidates’ results in the system of open list are distributed 
in accordance with the power law probability distribution, which suggests the 
multiplication of various kinds o f advantage o f the candidates. And as rese­
arch shows, the position on the list is only one of such advantages [Raciborski, 
Rakocy 2009], That is why not the empirically determined percentage of votes 
obtained by each candidate but rather the root of such participation was adop­
ted as the weight o f the position. Such rescaling led to the first position losing 
nearly half o f its weight at the expense of the other positions. Values assumed 
this way are also presented in Chart 1.
In the next step, the candidates coming from particular senate districts 
and their weights resulting from the positions on the list was determined for 
each senate district. Thus the significance of each senate district from the per­
spective of the particular party’s list was attributed to that district. This signifi­
cance was compared with the significance of the district for the result o f voting 
for the given party in the previous European Parliament election.
Very high correlation indices were obtained for both parties. Generally, 
the index was 0.75-0.76, but even when ignoring the extreme case of Warsaw 
I district, where one town clearly dominates over the rest of the district, the 
correlation coefficients still exceeded 0.6. In social sciences, such correlations 
are regarded as very strong. Such a strong correlation indicates the dominant 
pattern, as part o f which the territorial bond is one o f the key elements o f can­
didate list construction. Candidates from particular parts o f districts are pla­
ced on the lists in the order resulting from the weight these parts have for the 
general result o f the party. We can suppose that each of them is to “serve” the 
relevant part of territorial identities making up the whole district in European 
elections. This observation follows the phenomena also occurring in countries 
where closed candidate lists are used [Rahat, Elazan 2001], This issue might be 
seen from the perspective of general mechanisms of representative democracy: 
such a construction of the list would then be expected to ensure possibly com­
plete representation of individual parts of the country. The problem is that even 
in the largest parties the list o f each party receives only one seat in most elec­
toral districts. Hence, logically it is impossible to provide such representation. 
So putting up excessive numbers o f candidates has a purely marketing charac­
ter. “Serving” the voters gives them slight chance for real representation, whe­
reas it ensures additional votes for the list -  cast for candidates who are known 
in advance to be losers.
However, this correlation -  incomplete anyway -  shows that there is no 
absolute consistency between the construction o f the list and the weight o f par­
ticular parts of the district in European elections. At a closer look, a number of 
senate electoral districts, sometimes important for the election result, had no
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representatives from those districts on the lists, while in the neighbouring di­
stricts there were a few such representatives. The examples of electoral districts 
with no local candidates on either of the two main lists were e.g. the Tarnów 
district in Małopolskie Voivodeship or the Pińczów district in Świętokrzyskie 
Voivodeship.
Concentration o f  support
The importance of this factor is observed when the results o f first posi­
tion candidates are compared to the best of the remaining candidates in particu­
lar senate districts. The results for both parties are presented in Table 1. For each 
senate district (with the modifications described above) it shows what percenta­
ge of votes was cast for the candidate from no. 1 position and for the best of the 
remaining ones. The first candidate received on average 53% in PO and 45% in 
PiS. The best one of the rest received on average 26% in PO and 30% in PiS. 
The lighter background indicates the cases when support for the candidate was 
at least 1/3 higher than the mean for that candidate type. The darker background 
indicates the cases when support for the candidate was 1/3 lower than the mean.
Table 1. Results of no. 1 candidates and their strongest rivals in EP election 
divided into senate electoral districts
EP Senate main town PO 1 POother PiS 1
PiS
other
1 62 Słupsk 49% 23% 40% 23%
1 63 Chojnice 43% 18% 46% 20%
1 64 Gdynia 55% 25% 40% 36%
1 65 Gdańsk 49% 31% 55% 24%
1 66 Starogard Gd. 45% 24% 54% 11%
1 67 Malbork 52% 23% 59% 12%
2 9 Bydgoszcz 31% 49% 57% 36%
2 10 Inowrocław 27% 40% 48% 25%
2 11 Toruń 42% 43% 24% 65%
2 12 Grudziądz 26% 43% 32% 46%
2 13 W łocławek 30% 36% 40% 34%
3 59 Suwałki 70% 12% 49% 28%
3 60 Białystok 82% 8% 42% 45%
3 61 Bielsk Podl. 72% 16% 35% 28%
3 84 Elbląg 43% 27% 73% 6%
3 85 Ostróda 43% 25% 46% 34% |
3 86 Olsztyn 46% 44% 55% 16%
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EP Senate m ain town PO 1 POother PiS 1
PiS
other
3 87 Elk 48% 28% 55% 11%
4 40 Wołomin 69% 10% 31% 32%
4 41 Pruszków 71% 10% 40% 37%
4 42.45 Warsaw 74% 10% 49% 29%
5 38 Płock 51% 21% 47% 25%
5 39 Ciechanów 53% 22% 37% 25%
5 46 Ostrołęka 47% 35% 20% 36%
5 47 Mińsk Maz. 49% 31% 19% 22%
5 48 Siedlce 50% 25% 17% 34%
5 49 Grójec 51% 33% 11% 66%
5 50 Radom 47% 25% 6% 77%
6 23.24 Lódź 67% 18% 73% 15%
6 25 Łęczyca 68% 20% 76% 12%
6 26 Zgierz 64% 24% 73% 10% |
6 27 Sieradz 61% 16% 76% 10%
6 28 Piotrków Tryb. 62% 19% 82% 4%
6 29 Skierniewice 62% 16% 79% 12%
7 88 Pila 22% 65% 71% 8%
7 89 Szamotuły 28% 48% 65% 12%
7 90 Swarzędz 39% 27% 53% 26%
7 91 Poznań 42% 31% 48% 29%
7 92 Gniezno 34% 29% 61% 15%
7 93 Konin 24% 31% 72% 11%
7 94 Leszno 35% 28% 66% 12%
7 95 Ostrów Wlkp. 34% 39% 61% 15%
7 96 Kalisz 27% 42% 43% 46%
8 14 Puławy 41% 16% 30% 37%
8 15 Kraśnik 39% 31% 27% 49%
8 16 Lublin 33% 41% 36% 53%
8 17 Biała Podl. 44% 17% 25% 43%
8 18 Chełm 21% 66% 24% 43%
8 19 Zamość 38% 33% 15% 40%
9 54 Tarnobrzeg 33% 28% 58% 24%
9 55 Mielec 38% 47% 64% 22%
9 56 Rzeszów 66% 20% 58% 32%
9 57 Krosno 78% 6% 42% 30%
9 58 Przemyśl 65% 23% 65% 13%
10 30 Chrzanów 53% 14% 37% 37%
10 31 Olkusz 50% 19% 27% 45%
140
Candidate Selection in the 2014 European Parliament Election in Poland
EP Senate main town
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
12.33
34
35
36
37
81
82
83
68.69
70
71
72.73
74
75.8
76
77
78
Kraków
Bochnia
Tarnów
Nowy Targ
Nowy Sącz
Pińczów
Sandomierz
Kielce
Częstochowa
Gliwice
Zabrze
Rybnik-Jastrzębie-Zdrój
Chorzów
Katowice-Tychy
Dąbrowa G.
Sosnowiec
Bielsko-Biała
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
13
79
7.8
51
52
53
20
Cieszyn
Bolesławiec
Jelenia Góra
Legnica
Wałbrzych
Kłodzko
Oleśnica
Wroclaw
Nysa
Opole
Kędzierzyn-Koźle
Zielona Góra
13 21 Gorzów Wlkp.
13
13
13
13
13
22
97
98
99
100
Żagań
Szczecin
Stargard Sz.
Kołobrzeg
Koszalin
Source: Own study based on information from the National Electoral Commission.
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The cases of list leaders who obtained the greatest participation in par­
ticular electoral districts (exceeding 80%) have one thing in common. The m a­
jority of them are persons closely connected with the particular electoral di­
stricts and at the same time popular in the media. In the case of Civic Platform, 
Jerzy Buzek is such a person, and in the case of Law and Justice, it is Janusz 
Wojciechowski. Each of them achieves similar results in several neighbouring 
senate electoral districts. This way, media visibility and the bond with a larger 
area may give such a cumulated effect and a very high support index. However, 
if  we look at the cases when no. 1 candidates had the poorest results, the huge 
significance o f local rivals is noticeable. In the case o f PO, Chelm and Pila were 
such districts, and in PiS, Radom and Zamość. These cases are similar because 
none of these senate districts includes the central town of the EP electoral di­
stricts. In territorial opposition of this kind, internal competition within the list 
is the most clearly seen.
The poor result on the list does not necessarily mean that the candidate 
is weak. In the Opole district, previous MEP Danuta Jazlowiecka, coming from 
that district, received two thirds o f the votes cast for PO -  more than twice as 
many as the person from no. 1 position on the PO list, the Minister of Culture 
Bogdan Zdrojewski, a person present in the media and commonly recognisable. 
On the other side of the district, in Jelenia Góra, the same Bogdan Zdrojewski 
received ten times greater support than the strongest of his rivals.
Even greater relations of this kind occur on the lists of PiS, where 
Zbigniew Kuźmiuk standing from a far position obtained more than a dozen 
times greater support in the Radom district than the no. 1 candidate, Wojciech 
Jasiński, residing in Plock. But there are cases in which the weakness of num­
ber one candidate results from the dispersion o f support among a group of other 
candidates, where the sum of candidate number one and the best candidate 
in the district does not exceed 50%.
To sum up, it may be said that the ordinance in which a voter is forced to 
choose one candidate on the list and districts cover geographically and histori­
cally varied areas activates a very complicated game among parties, individual 
candidates, their position in the media and local connections. Ail that leads to 
the fact that a considerable part of attention of political actors themselves and the 
media coverage is focused on this game. The game has an important impact on 
the personal composition of Polish representation in the European Parliament. 
The advantage of the candidates placed on the first positions on the lists is clear­
ly visible. However, it must be said that the advantage is not overwhelming and 
can be eliminated by territorial bonds or the advantage of the incumbent.
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